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Abstract: It has been widely accepted since Stanley and Williamson (2001) that the only 
linguistically acceptable semantic treatments for sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ 
involve treating the wh-complement ‘how to V’ as an interrogative phrase, denoting a set of 
propositions. Recently a number of authors – most notably Bengson and Moffett (2011) – 
have suggested that the ‘how to V’ phrase denotes not a proposition, but an object. This view 
points toward a prima facie plausible non-propositional semantics for knowledge-how, which 
treats ‘how to V’ as a free relative noun phrase (Bach 2012), (Abbott 2013). In this paper I 
argue that the free relative semantics is implausible. I show that linguistic phenomena which 
seem to support a free relative semantics can be explained by the supporter of an 
interrogative semantics, and demonstrate that standard linguistic tests strongly suggest that 
‘how to V’ has an interrogative reading, and no free relative reading. 
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Knowledge-How: Interrogatives and Free Relatives 
What does it take to know how to do something? Is it a matter of having propositional 
knowledge, or does it take some kind of non-propositional knowledge? Since Stanley and 
Williamson’s (henceforth S&W) 2001 article, consideration of this question has undergone a 
semantic ascent. Questions about the nature of knowledge-how have been displaced by 
questions about the semantics of sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’.1 This ascent is 
typically taken to favour Propositionalist views, which take knowledge-how to have a 
propositional object, over Non-Propositionalist views, which take knowledge-how to have a 
non-propositional object.2 A propositional account of ‘S knows how to V’ can be easily 
derived from a standard picture of wh-complements which treats ‘how to V’ as an 
interrogative clause denoting a question  (Brown 1971), (S&W 2001), (Stanley 2011a, 
2011b). By contrast, Non-Propositionalists appear to face a problem of semantic 
implementation, since it is has been widely supposed that there just aren’t any linguistically 
acceptable non-propositional semantics for ‘knows how’ ascriptions. 
 In this paper, I consider what I take to be the most plausible non-interrogative 
semantics for ‘knows-how’ ascriptions, which treats the ‘how to V’ phrase as a free relative 
noun phrase denoting an object. This view has been suggested by Bach (2012), and Abbott 
(2013: 4), but has not been subject to sustained consideration. According to a free relative 
semantics, sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ pick out a relation to an object, rather 
than a proposition. If linguistically plausible, this semantics would provide a natural way to 
implement Bengson and Moffett’s (henceforth B&M) Objectualist account of knowledge-
                                                                
1 I will use single quotes to refer to sentences that are used to ascribe knowledge-how. All unquoted 
occurrences refer to the state of knowledge-how itself. 
2 I use these labels to pick out views about the object of knowledge-how, putting to one side other 
commitments associated with Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism, concerning the relation 
between know-how and ability, and the metaphysical grounds of knowledge-how. Objectualism is 
only one species of Non-Propositionalism. Another possibility is that knowledge-how involves a 
knowledge relation to an activity (Hornsby 2011), (Wiggins 2012). 
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how, which claims that knowing how to do something is objectual knowledge of a way of 
acting (B&M 2011b).3  In this paper, I will argue that on balance the free relative semantics is 
not linguistically plausible. Although B&M consider a number of linguistic phenomena that 
seem to suggest such a view, these phenomena can equally be explained by interrogative 
semantics. Furthermore, standard linguistic tests for detecting interrogative and free relative 
readings strongly suggest that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ have a clear 
interrogative reading, and no free relative reading. The upshot is that the free relative 
semantics are implausible, meaning that Objectualists need to look elsewhere for a way to 
semantically implement their view. 
 The plan of action is as follows. In the first section, I lay out the distinction between 
Interrogative and Free Relative readings of wh-phrases. In the second section, I relate these 
two readings to the debate about the nature of knowledge-how, and consider some 
methodological issues about the relation between metaphysics and linguistic evidence. In the 
third section, I consider B&M’s linguistic evidence that ‘how to V’ has an objectual reading, 
and in the final section I consider linguistic tests for detecting Interrogative and Free Relative 
readings. 
1. Interrogatives and Free relatives 
We can get an intuitive grip on the distinction between interrogative and free relative 
wh-phrases by considering the different meanings that wh-phrases can have.4  Consider the 
following sentences: 
(1) I asked what was for dinner. 
                                                                
3 An alternative Non-Propositionalist view, which I will not have space to consider, is that 
knowledge-how is a knowledge relation to an action-type or activity (Hornsby 2011: 92), (Wiggins 
2012) 
4 Standard linguistic treatments of this distinction can be found in (Baker 1995), (Bresnan and 
Grimshaw 1978),  (Huddleston and Pullum 2008: 1068-79). 
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(2) I ate what I was given. 
We can give an account of the meaning of sentence (1) by reading the wh-phrase as 
having an interrogative meaning, denoting a question.5 Sentence (1) is true if I utter the 
sentence ‘what’s for dinner?’ (or some sentence with a similar meaning) thereby asking the 
question what is for dinner?. However, it would be wrong to treat the wh-phrase in sentence 
(2) in the same manner. Sentence (2) doesn’t claim that I ate the question what was I given?. 
Questions aren’t the kinds of things we can eat. Hence, in (2) the wh-phrase ‘what I was 
given’ must denote something else, plausibly some stuff that I was given. Linguists standardly 
explain this difference in meaning by claiming that in sentence (1) the wh-phrase is 
functioning as an interrogative phrase, denoting a question, whereas in (2) the wh-phrase is 
functioning as a free relative noun phrase, denoting an object. 
We can often work out how a wh-complement is functioning by considering the 
meaning of the embedding verb. Some verbs can relate only to questions, requiring an 
interrogative reading of their wh-complements, whereas other verbs can relate only to non-
propositional objects, requiring a free relative reading. For example, ‘ask’, ‘inquire’ and 
‘wonder’ can only relate to questions, whereas ‘eat’, ‘take’ and ‘give’ can only relate to 
objects.  
When a verb doesn’t make such a restriction in virtue of its meaning we find 
sentences that are ambiguous between the free relative and embedded question readings, 
which are helpful for seeing the distinction at issue.6 Consider the following situation: Tariq 
and Mona are spies. Their job is to keep track of rival spies who are after their country’s 
nuclear codes, and to inform their superiors whenever the rival spies attempt to communicate 
                                                                
5 In what follows I will use single quotes for interrogative phrases, and italics for questions. On this 
convention the interrogative phrase ‘what day is it?’ denotes the question what day is it?. 
6 For a parallel example with ‘ask’, see (Michaelis 2011: footnote 3) 
 5 
with their handlers. Tariq and Mona do not themselves know the nuclear codes. They are 
tracking two spies: Jorge and Petra. It is common knowledge between them that Petra has a 
belief about what the codes are, although they don’t know the content of that belief, or 
whether it is true. Tariq utters the following sentence: 
(3) Jorge knows what Petra believes. 
There are two interpretations of this sentence, which have different presuppositions, 
and make different commitments as to the relation of Jorge and Petra.7  
If we read ‘what Petra believes’ as a free relative, it denotes the thing which Petra 
believes — that the nuclear code is XYZ. On this reading (3) says that Jorge knows the thing 
that Petra merely believes: that XYZ is the nuclear code. On this reading, this sentence 
presupposes that Petra’s belief is true, since Petra believes the proposition that Jorge knows, 
and knowledge is factive. However, this reading says nothing about Jorge’s relation to Petra: 
they might have the same beliefs without ever having heard of one another. 
By contrast, if we read ‘what Petra believes’ as an interrogative, it denotes a question, 
meaning that (3) says that Jorge knows the answer to the question of what Petra believes. 
This question might either be answered by a proposition like Petra has some belief about 
what the nuclear code is, or by a proposition like Petra believes that the Nuclear codes are 
XYZ. On this reading, (3) does not presuppose that Petra has a true belief, because it might be 
that Jorge only knows that Petra has some belief or other about the codes, without having any 
knowledge about what the code is.  However, this sentence does require that Jorge is aware 
                                                                
7 One way to make these readings salient is by shifting focus. Consider: 
 
3a) Jorge KNOWS what Petra BELIEVES 
3b) Jorge knows WHAT Petra believes 
 
The pattern of focus in (3a) favours the free relative reading, whereas the focus in (3b) favours an 
interrogative reading. 
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of Petra, since he cannot know that she believes such-and-such without having some idea 
about who she is.8 
2. Free Relative Semantics for ‘S knows how to V’ 
 
 Having got clear on the difference between interrogatives and free relatives, let’s 
connect this distinction to the debate about the nature of knowledge-how. Applying the 
interrogative and free relative treatments to sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ gives 
us the following general truth conditions (with brackets used to pick out the object of the 
knowledge relation): 
KH-INT: ‘S knows how to V’ is true iff for some way w, S knows [that w is a way to V] 
KH-FR: ‘S knows how to V’ is true iff for some way w, S knows [w] and w is a way to 
V 
Removing the quotation marks in these semantic treatments gives us two rather different 
accounts of the nature of knowledge-how.9 Disquotation on KH-INT yields the claim that 
knowledge-how is knowledge of a certain kind of proposition about the nature of knowledge-
how. By contrast, disquotation on KH-FR yields the claim that knowledge-how is a kind of 
objectual knowledge of a relevant way of acting. Whereas KH-INT is a natural partner for 
                                                                
8 Sentences like (3) pose an interesting problem for Brogaard’s account of knowledge-wh. She treats 
interrogative wh-complements and free relatives as having the same kind of meaning (2008:162, 
2009: 449-53), (Schaffer 2009: 486-91), which means she doesn’t have the resources to explain 
sentences which are intuitively ambiguous between interrogative and free relative readings. She 
considers a related sentence – ‘what John is is boring’ (2008: example (30c) on 165) – but her 
comments do not suggest a general strategy for explaining this ambiguity. 
9 In fact, KH-INT and KH-FR yield two families of views, since both leave open a number of 
important linguistic and philosophical issues. Both accounts leave open how to interpret the 
unpronounced pronoun PRO (Stanley 2011b: C3), whether the modality associated with the infinitive 
is deontic (Brown 1971), (Besson MS), bouletic (Bhatt 2006), or abilitative (Stanley 2011b: 126–7), 
what ways of acting are (B&M 2011b: 189–95), and what the properties of the relevant knowledge-
relation are. The interrogative semantics also strictly speaking leaves open whether the wh-phrase 
takes a mention-all, or mention-some reading (Stanley 2011b: 183), although for simplicity KH-INT 
appeals to the mention-some reading. 
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Propositionalism; KH-FR is a natural partner for an Objectualist account of knowledge-how, 
as Bach (2012) and Abbott (2013) observe. 
 
The best-developed version of Objectualism is B&M (2011b) (but see also Michaelson 
MS). On B&M’s view, knowing how to do something is objectual knowledge of a way of 
engaging in that activity, together with a distinctive kind of action-guiding conception of that 
way of acting. B&M have an ambivalent relation with the Free Relative semantics. A good 
deal of the evidence for their view comes from linguistic arguments which can easily be 
adjusted to support the free relative semantics, as we shall see in the next section. However, 
B&M are cagey about the connection, claiming that: 
 
It is not clear to what extent the metaphysical distinction between propositions and 
ways of acting currently at issue corresponds to the linguistic distinction between 
embedded questions [i.e. interrogatives] and free relatives. (2011b: footnote 42) 
 
In the remainder of this section, I want to address B&M’s worry by offering a picture of 
the relation between linguistic and metaphysical claims. This is controversial territory, so I 
will proceed carefully. I will first offer an argument for a minimal connection between the 
semantics for ‘knows how’ ascriptions and the correct account of knowledge-how, which I 
call the semantic implementability constraint. I will then distinguish this constraint from 
some of the other ways which Propositionalists have employed linguistic evidence, and show 
that this constraint doesn’t face some of the worries which face these ways of using linguistic 
evidence. With this methodological background in place, I will answer B&M’s worry, 
pointing out that endorsing the free relative semantics allows the Objectualist to meet the 
semantic implementability constraint.  
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 I take the semantic implementability constraint to follow from the idea that the 
subject-matter of the debate about knowledge-how is the folk notion of knowledge-how. The 
line of thought goes like this. We use sentences of various natural languages to pick out states 
of knowledge-how. It is reasonable to assume that at least some (although certainly not all) of 
these sentences are true. Let’s assume the English sentence ‘Laura Trott knows how to cycle’ 
is true.10 If this sentence is true and picks out Trott’s state of know-how, then the correct 
account of the metaphysics of Trott’s state of know-how will be compatible with the correct 
account of the truth-conditions of this sentence.  This is just an application of the truth 
schema — ’S’ is true iff S — in the right to left direction, pointing out that the correct 
account of the of nature a particular piece of knowledge-how will be compatible with the 
correct account of the semantics of the ordinary language sentences used to pick out that 
state. In general terms, the semantic implementability constraint is just the idea that the 
correct account of knowledge-how needs to be able to give a compatible semantics for 
‘knows how’ ascriptions.  
 
The implementability constraint should be distinguished from some of the more 
controversial ways in which linguistic evidence has been used knowledge-how debate.  
 
S&W (2001), and Stanley (2011a, 2011b) employ what might think of as a linguistics-
first methodology (see Devitt 2011). Whereas the semantic implementability constraint reads 
the truth schema from right to left, requiring that a metaphysical account be able to give a 
compatible semantics, the linguistics-first methodology reads the truth schema from left to 
                                                                
10 Strictly speaking, we should apply the semantic implementability constraint cross-linguistically, but 
this raises methodological issues beyond the scope of this paper. For the cross-linguistic data, see 
(Rumfitt 2003), (Douskos 2013), and (Ditter 2016) 
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right, starting with the best linguistic account of the semantics of ‘knows how’ ascriptions, 
and then reading off the compatible metaphysics. Although Stanley presents this 
methodology as requiring nothing more than the commitment to the truth schema (2011b: 
143-9), in order to read the truth-schema in the left to right direction one needs to think that 
linguistic evidence somehow has methodological priority over other kinds of philosophical 
evidence (Brown 2013). To put the point glibly: Stanley might be right that linguists are 
doing metaphysics in the formal mode (2011b: 144), but the important question is whether 
they are doing good metaphysics. The semantic implementability constraint makes no 
commitment to the priority of linguistic evidence, since it involves reading the truth schema 
from right to left, meaning that it leaves open the possibility of motivating a novel semantics 
for ‘knows how’ ascriptions on non-linguistic grounds. 
 
Another way to appeal to linguistic evidence appeals to the linguistic uniformity between 
‘knows how’ ascriptions and other ‘knows wh’ ascriptions (see (Snowdon 2004: 6-8), 
(Stanley 2011a: 208), and (B&M 2011b: 178-80)). Stanley sums up this argument nicely: 
 
It is a common assumption between the Rylean and the Intellectualist that sentences 
involving constructions like “know where + infinitive”, “know when + infinitive”, 
“know why + infinitive”, etc. all can be defined in terms of propositional knowledge. 
But given that ascriptions of knowing-how in English look so similar to such 
ascriptions, it is hard to see how they could ascribe a different kind of mental state. 
(Stanley 2011a: 208) 
 
The idea here is that when doing linguistic analysis, we ought to expect constructions 
which have similar syntactic and semantic behaviour to be generated from a uniform 
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underlying metaphysical structure. Importantly, this kind of argument is at best a ceteris 
paribus consideration to be fed into our theorising alongside other kinds of considerations. 
There are many cases in which prima facie syntactically uniform constructions pick out 
extremely different kinds of entities, as Michaelis observes (2011: 261-2) One reason for 
especially being suspicious about appeals to linguistic similarity is that there seem to be 
philosophical dissimilarities between knowledge-how and knowledge-wh. Knowledge-how 
seems to have rather different epistemic properties to other kinds of knowledge-wh (see the 
discussion of justification in §3). Notice that non-linguistic dissimilarities do not cause 
problem for the semantic implementability constraint: if knowledge-how turns out to be a 
very different kind of state to other kinds of knowledge-wh, we should still want a semantics 
for ordinary knowledge-how ascriptions.11 
 
What are the upshots of the semantic implementability constraint for Objectualism? In 
order to tell whether an account of the nature of knowledge-how is semantically 
implementable, a natural approach is to collect the semantics for ‘knows how’ ascriptions 
proposed by linguists and linguistically informed philosophers, and consider whether any of 
those semantics is compatible with the metaphysical account. If it turns out that an account of 
knowledge-how is not compatible with any off-the-shelf semantics, then this is a strike 
against that account, because this provides evidence that our ordinary ‘knows how’ 
ascriptions are not picking out the state posited by that account, leaving the proponent of that 
account open to the change that they are changing the subject away from our ordinary notion 
                                                                
11 One consequence of B&M’s employment of a uniformity argument is that they end up committed 
to the claim that all ‘knows-wh’ ascriptions pick out states of objectual knowledge. I think that this 
view is extremely implausible (the tests detailed in §4 show that many ‘knows wh’ ascriptions involve 
interrogatives (Schaffer 2009: 486-91)). For the sake of simplicity, I will put this generalised 
Objectualism to one side to focus on the claim that ‘knows how’ ascriptions involve an object-
denoting wh-phrase. An exception is that I will assume that ‘knows-whether’ ascriptions involve an 
interrogative, since I’m not even clear what it would be to claim that knowledge-whether is a kind of 
objectual knowledge. 
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of knowledge-how (B&M 2011a: 36–7). However, there are a number of ways in which the 
supporter of such an account might respond to this challenge. One option would be to offer a 
novel account of the semantics our ordinary ‘knows how’ ascriptions that is amenable to their 
metaphysics. An alternative is to opt for an error theory of our ordinary ascriptions. If our 
ordinary knowledge-how ascriptions are simply false, then the charge of changing the subject 
loses its sting.  
 
With this background in place, it is clear that the supporter of Objectualism should be in 
the game of finding a linguistically plausible semantics for ‘knows how’ ascriptions in order 
to implement their account. How might they do this? Obviously, S&W’s preferred 
interrogative semantics is not compatible with an Objectualist account of knowledge-how. 
B&M point out that there are a number of alternatives to the interrogative semantics, citing 
(Roberts 2009), (Ginzburg 2011), and (Michaelis 2011) as examples.12 However, none of 
these treatments are friendly to Objectualism.  Roberts (2009) builds on work by Dowty and 
Jacobsen to argue that infinitival how-to phrases are property-denoting verb phrases built on 
partition semantics, meaning that on her account predicts that knowledge-how is a relation to 
a certain kind of goal-related property. Although Ginzburg (2011) suggests that some non-
English infinitival knowledge ascriptions are non-propositional, he treats ‘S knows how to V’ 
as involving a relation to a fact. Michaelis (2011) treats wh-complements as presupposing an 
open proposition (of the form: x is F),13 and asserting that the agent knows the unbound 
variable in that open proposition. Michaelis’ view can sound close to Objectualism, but she 
explicitly claims that her account is truth-conditionally equivalent to Stanley’s account 
                                                                
12 See also (Brown 1971), and (Bhatt 2006), which stick with interrogative semantics, but offer 
different accounts of the modality involved. 
13 On the difference between open propositions and sets of propositions, see (Friedman 2013: 152-3) 
 12 
(Michaelis 2011: 277) meaning that her account should not be construed as an alternative to 
the interrogative semantics.14  
So from the currently available semantics for knowledge-how ascriptions, it seems that 
the free relative semantics is the Objectualist’s best bet for directly meeting the semantic 
implementability constraint. As we’ve just noted, if the free relative semantics is not 
linguistically plausible, this is not a reason to outright reject Objectualism, but it does leave 
them either taking on the burden of developing a novel semantics, or endorsing an error 
theory. 
 
3. Evidence that ‘How to V’ is a Free Relative 
 B&M appeal to four linguistic phenomena to build an argument for thinking that the 
‘how to’ complement in knows how ascriptions denotes an object rather than a proposition 
(B&M 2011b: 178-85):  
 i) The availability of apparent objectual paraphrases for ‘knows how ‘ ascriptions,  
 ii) The fact that ’knows how’ ascriptions fail to take propositional modifiers,  
 iii) The oddness of raising the question of justification about knowledge-how, 
  iv) The gradability of ‘knows how’ ascriptions.  
 Although B&M present these phenomena as evidence for Objectualism, rather for a 
free relative semantics, their explanations of these phenomena are also available to the 
supporter of the free relative semantics. However, I don’t think that these phenomena provide 
a compelling argument for the free relative semantics, since all of them can also be explained 
                                                                
14 Michaelis also makes the suggestion that what it is to know the value of a variable is to be able to 
find it (2011: 278). This suggests that she’s committed to an ability-based account of knowledge-how. 
For other ability-based accounts of knowledge-wh, see (Masto 2010), (Farkas 2016). 
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by the supporter of an interrogative semantics. This is bad news for both Objectualism and 
free relative semantics since it removes a central plank in the case for both views. 
B&M’s first piece of linguistic evidence for thinking that ‘how to V’ denotes an 
object comes from the paraphrases for ‘knows-how’ ascriptions. They claim that the natural 
paraphrase for (4) is not S&W’s (4a), but rather (4b):  
(4) Ana knows how to swim. 
(4a) Ana knows [that w is a way in which she herself can swim]. 
(4b) Ana knows [the way to swim]. 
They point out that the naturalness of (4b) is good news for the objectualist, since in 
this paraphrase the object of knowledge seems to be an object-denoting noun phrase – the 
way to swim – rather than a proposition-denoting that-clause. This paraphrase is also 
extremely close to the free relative reading of ‘how to swim’, suggesting that the natural 
paraphrase is free relative friendly. 
Although this paraphrase is suggestive, a supporter of the interrogative semantics can 
easily explain it. ‘Knowledge-the’ ascriptions like (4b) plausibly have a concealed question 
reading which is equivalent to an interrogative knowledge-wh ascription (White 1982: 31-2), 
(Brogaard 2008), (Bach 2012). Consider: 
(5) Jane knows the capital of Mali. 
This sentence has two readings: an objectual reading which says that Jane is 
acquainted with Bamako, and a concealed question or quasi-interrogative reading which says 
that Jane knows what the Capital of Mali is but makes no commitments about acquaintance. 
Given the concealed question reading of ‘knows-the’ ascriptions it is unsurprising that 
 14 
interrogative knowledge-wh can be paraphrased by ‘knowledge-the’ ascriptions, as Pavese 
points out (2013, footnote 15). Taking a concealed question approach to (4b) the sentence 
comes out as meaning ‘Ana knows what a way to swim is’, which is not only an 
interrogative, but also pretty close to S&W’s proposed paraphrase (4a).1516 
B&M’s second piece of evidence comes from the observation that the complement in 
‘knows how’ ascriptions fails to take modifiers that are appropriate for that-clauses. For 
example: 
(6) Ana knows that the Prime Minister is a man – so it must be true! 
sounds fine, but: 
(7) ?Ana knows how to swim – so it must be true! 
Seems grammatically odd.17 Following B&M, we might think that sentence (7) is odd 
because the how-complement denotes an object, and objects cannot be true. The supporter of 
the free relative semantics can appeal to the same explanation, since on their view ‘how to 
swim’ is an object-denoting noun-phrase. 
B&M also note that ‘knowledge-how’ ascriptions seem not to be ‘bumped up’ to 
certainty – as knowledge-that ascriptions are –  but rather seem to be bumped up to mastery: 
                                                                
15 Jennifer Hornsby has pointed out to me that we also use ascriptions like ‘Jane knows loads of ways 
to swim’ which like (4b) suggest an objectual reading. It seems to me that ascriptions of this form are 
also susceptible to a concealed question analysis, despite not involving ‘the’. For example ‘Jane 
knows loads of Capitals of African Countries’ has a reading which means ‘Jane knows what the 
capitals of loads of African countries are.’ On this treatment, ‘Jane knows loads of ways to swim’ 
would mean something like ‘Jane knows what loads of ways to swim are’. 
16 It is worth noting that whereas ‘knows-the’ sentences can take either a concealed question or an 
objectual reading, ‘learns-the’ sentences like ‘Joan learnt the capital of Mali’ can only take a 
concealed question reading, which suggests that ‘learns’ cannot take an objectual complement. This is 
an awkward result for the objectualist, given the close conceptual connections between learning and 
knowing (Pavese, forthcoming). 
17 I use ? to mark grammatically anomalous sentences. Note that a grammatically acceptable sentence 
can still be semantically or pragmatically odd. Some of the example sentences given below certainly 
are. 
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(8) ? Ana knows how to swim – in fact, she’s certain of it!  
(9) Ana knows how to swim—in fact, she's mastered it! 
There is a parallel argument in the offing here. The supporter of a free relative 
semantics can point out that one cannot be certain of ways, although one can master them.  
Although these arguments initially seem appealing, they end up significantly over-
generating.  It is east to construct examples in which other kinds of ‘knows-wh’ ascriptions 
fail to take these modifiers. Consider: 
(10) ? Ruth knows whether the Prime minister is a woman – so it must be true! 
(11) ? Lani knows who came to the party — so it must be true 
Sentences (10) and (11) sound just as weird as (7), which suggests that if one wants to 
take this evidence seriously, it supports the claim that a whole swathe of ‘knows wh’ 
ascription have a free relative reading, which is a contentious position. B&M do float the idea 
that all knows-wh involves objectual knowledge (see footnote 11 above), so we might think 
that they would be happy to endorse a general free relative semantics. However, even they 
ought to baulk at the suggestion that ‘knows-whether’ ascriptions involve a free relative 
complement. It’s difficult to even make sense of the idea that a ‘whether’ clause denotes an 
object.18 
Furthermore, the supporter of an interrogative semantics can appeal to a fairly simple 
explanation for the oddness of these sentences. According to the interrogative semantics, a 
wh-phrase denotes not a proposition, but a question. And on the face of it, questions aren’t 
                                                                
18 In footnote 11 I put to one side the issue of whether non-how ‘knows-wh’ ascriptions involve free 
relatives, excepting the case of ‘knows-whether’, which I take to be obviously propositional. In what 
follows I will assume that ‘knows-whether’ is propositional in order to test a number of arguments for 
the free relative semantics.  
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the kinds of things which can be true or false.19 So, we might think that (7), (10), and (11) are 
odd because of anaphora failure. The modifying phrase ‘so it must be true’ involves the 
anaphoric ‘it’, which looks back in the sentence to find something which might be true. Since 
the interrogative phrase denotes a question, one might think that the anaphoric phrase is odd 
because question are the only available reference for the anaphoric ‘it’, and questions cannot 
be true or false. The general lesson is that although the Propositionalist is committed to 
thinking that ‘knowledge-wh’ ascriptions are made true by states of propositional knowledge, 
they don’t need to think that ‘knows-that’ and ‘knows-wh’ ascriptions have precisely the 
same semantic or syntactic properties.20 
The supporter of an interrogative semantics can also explain the appropriateness of 
(9). Presumably one can master activities as well as ways of acting. And, on the standard 
interrogative semantics, (9) relates Ana to a question about the activity of swimming. So on 
the standard interrogative semantics for (9) the first part of the sentence includes a term 
picking out an activity which can be the subject of anaphoric reference in phrases like ‘in 
fact, she’s mastered it’.  
                                                                
19 For example, one plausible view of questions identifies them with a partition of mutually exclusive 
complete answering propositions (Groendijk and Stokhof 1984). Since a partition is not the kind of 
thing that can be true or false, this view can easily explain the weirdness of (7), (10), and (11). 
20 B&M consider this kind of response (B&M 2011b: footnote 43). They point out that this 
explanation predicts that anaphora with predicates of questions (like: ‘it is easily answered’, ‘it is a 
difficult question’, or ‘it is extremely interesting’) ought to be acceptable. They give an example of 
this kind of anaphora which seems bad: 
 
1) ? Michael knows how to swim; it is easily answered 
 
However, there are other examples which seem grammatically acceptable, although baroque: 
 
2) Xenia knows how to solve the puzzle; although it is a difficult question. 
3) Paula knows how to prove the ABC conjecture; it is extremely interesting. 
 
It is also worth noting that part of the oddness of 1) might well come from the fact that how to swim is 
not an easy question, which is a semantic rather than a grammatical issue with the sentence. 
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Examples like (8) involving ‘in fact, she’s certain of it’ are a little trickier to deal 
with. Intuitively, one can be certain of questions — consider ‘Paul was certain of who came 
to the party’ —, so the interrogative semantics predicts that these sentences ought to be 
acceptable. Interestingly, the parallel examples for ‘knows-whether’ are a little strange but 
seem grammatically acceptable. For example: 
(12) Ruth knows whether the Prime Minister is a woman — in fact she’s certain of it! 
sounds fine. This sentence says that Ruth doesn’t merely know, but is certain of 
whether the PM is a woman.  Pretty much all of the examples here are controversial, but I 
think that are some ‘knows how’ sentences involving certainty which seem grammatically 
acceptable.  For example: 
(13) Ana knows how to pronounce ‘phở’ — in fact she’s certain of it! 
Sounds grammatically acceptable to me: it says that Ana doesn’t merely know, but is 
certain of how to pronounce ‘phở’.21 There’s certainly room for disagreement about the 
acceptability of this sentence, and I can easily imagine supporters of the free relative 
semantic contending sticking to their guns, and claiming that (13) is unacceptable. However, 
if there is disagreement about our intuitions, this is bad news for the supporter of free relative 
semantics. If there are conflicting or fuzzy intuitions about the acceptability of a class of 
sentences, then neither side of the debate ought to be relying on the acceptability (or 
unacceptability) of these sentences as motivation for their view, which means that examples 
like (8), (12), and (13) are not admissible evidence for either side.  
                                                                
21 Incidentally, (13) sounds even better to me if we omit the final ‘of it’: 
 
(13a) Ana knows how to pronounce ‘phở’ — in fact she’s certain! 
 
I should note that an anonymous reviewer has reported opposing intuitions about (13a), underlining 
the trickiness of relying on intuitions about grammaticality in this area (see below). 
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B&M’s third piece of evidence is the fact that ‘knows-how’ ascriptions do not open 
up the question of justification, unlike ‘knows-that’ ascriptions (Austin 1956). They point to 
the following exchange: 
(14)  a) Martin knows how to get to the airport, 
b) Hmmm … is he really justified in believing that? 
The response in (14b) is certainly odd, and one might think that this is because 
knowledge-how is not the kind of knowledge which involves justification.  
However, the supporter of an interrogative semantics can explain the oddness of this 
exchange by appealing to the same kind of anaphora failure which occurs in sentence (7), (8), 
(10) and (11). The response in (14b) involves an anaphoric ‘that’ which looks for a 
proposition in (14a) about which one can raise the question of justification. However, if the 
interrogative semantics is correct, then (14a) ascribes knowledge of a question, meaning that 
there are no propositions available for the anaphoric ‘that’ to pick up on. Consider a parallel 
example with ‘knows-whether’: 
15 )  a) Martin knows whether to swim 
 b) Hmmm … is he really justified in believing that? 
The response in (15b) is just as weird as (14b), suggesting that the oddness stems from 
problems with anaphoric reference to interrogative phrases, rather than any special features of 
‘how to V’ phrases. 
Putting the oddness of (14b) to one side, one might think that there remains a 
powerful non-linguistic argument for Objectualism in the offing here. It seems that there are 
many cases in which agents know how without having a related justified belief (Cath 2011), 
(Glick 2011: 408-9), (Weatherson 2016: 12–3). Since most theories of the propositional 
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knowledge relation claim that it requires justification, one might take the observation that we 
seem to have here a case of knowledge-how without justification as evidence that the relation 
involved in knowledge-how is something other than propositional knowledge. In particular, 
one might take this as an argument for thinking that knowledge-how is non-justification 
entailing objectual knowledge. This is an instance of a wider class of arguments which we 
might call divergence arguments, which are most familiar from the debate about the 
Gettierisability of knowledge-how (Poston 2009), (Cath 2011, 2015), (Carter and Pritchard 
2015). These arguments contend that knowledge-how cannot be a kind of knowledge-that 
because the two kinds of knowledge have different epistemic properties. 
A successful divergence argument establishes that knowledge-how involves a relation 
with different epistemic properties to standard examples of knowledge-that. However this 
result doesn’t establish that the object of knowledge-how is anything other than a proposition. 
Supposing that knowledge-how does not entail justification, it might be the case that 
knowledge-how is a special kind of non-justification-entailing propositional knowledge, or 
that knowledge-how is a non-knowledge constituting relation to a proposition.22 Although 
positing that knowledge-how is a kind of non-justification entailing propositional knowledge 
seems rather ad hoc, there are various accounts of propositional knowledge on the market 
which claim that propositional knowledge does not require justification (Goldman 1967), 
(Kornblith 2008).23 So, even if the divergence argument for justification goes through, it does 
not establish that the object of knowledge-how is anything other than a proposition. 
B&M’s final piece of evidence comes from the apparent gradability of ‘knows-how’ 
ascriptions. We can say one person knows how to do something better than someone else, or 
                                                                
22 Both of these moves are somewhat controversial, but are represented in the literature. For the 
analogue moves in the Gettierisability debate, see (Cath 2015) and (Cath 2011) respectively. 
23 It is worth pointing out that sections 7.2. and 7.3. of Know How are effectively an extended version 
of this style of response to various divergence arguments. See (Stanley 2011b 166-7). 
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that they know in part how to do something. These qualitative and quantitative modifiers 
don’t apply to ‘knows that’ ascriptions, suggesting that know-how, but not know-that, can 
come in degrees (Ryle 2009: 46). A free relative semantics is in a nice place to explain this 
data, since objectual knowledge ascriptions also permit degree modifiers – one can have 
partial knowledge of Paris, or know Paris better than someone else. These modifiers can be 
neatly explained by pointing out that one can be more or less acquainted with an object, 
suggesting that these modifiers grade the knowledge-how relation. 
However, a supporter of Interrogative semantics can also provide plausible 
explanations for the gradability of knowledge-how ascriptions, positing that these modifiers 
attach to the object of knowledge-how. For example, Stanley treats comparative modifiers 
like better than as grading the quality of the ways known (2011b: 31-5) and Pavese argues 
that degree modifiers like ‘in part’ mark a partial answer to the embedded question (Pavese 
2013, MS) (see also Roberts 2009). The upshot is that both Objectualism and 
Propositionalism can explain the gradability of ‘knows how’ ascriptions, although 
Objectualism posits a modification of the knowledge relation, and Propositionalism a 
modification of the objects of knowledge. 
To sum up, the four linguistic phenomena that B&M appeal to in support of 
Objectualism to are suggestive of a free relative semantics, although closer attention shows 
us that a supporter of interrogative semantics can also explain these features, meaning that the 
ability to explain these linguistic phenomena is not a reason to prefer a free relative semantics 
over an interrogative semantics.  
4. Tests for Distinguishing Free Relatives from Interrogatives  
 There are a number of linguistic tests which can be used to determine whether a 
‘knows wh’ ascription has an interrogative or free relative reading (Schaffer 2009: 486-91). 
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These tests pose a serious problem for the free relative semantics for ‘know-how’, since ‘S 
knows how to V’ systematically tests positive for an interrogative reading and negative for a 
free relative reading.  
 There are five tests for detecting an interrogative reading of a wh-phrase: 
i) Wh-the-hell: If the wh-phrase can be extended to an exclamation like wh-the-
hell then it has an interrogative reading (Zwicky and Sadock 1975); 
ii) Co-ordination: If the wh-phrase can be embedded within a verb which only 
accepts interrogative complements – like ‘wonder’, ‘ask’, or ‘inquire’ – then it 
has an interrogative reading (Bresnan and Grimshaw 1978: 332), (Baker 1995: 
204-7); 
iii) Multiple questions: If the wh-phrase can be extended to include multiple 
question-words, then has an interrogative reading (Baker 1968), (Bresnan and 
Grimshaw 1978: 335); 
iv) Paraphrase: If the wh-phrase involves, or can be paraphrased by, a question-
word that cannot take a free relative reading, then it has an interrogative 
reading (Baker 1995: 217); 
v) Infinitive: If the wh-phrase is infinitival, then it is an interrogative, and not a 
free relative (Baker 1995: 216-18), (Huddleston and Pullum 2008: 1070-3).  
A couple of points about these tests. First, the tests merely detect a reading of a wh-
phrase, so testing positive for one reading doesn’t establish that the other reading is not 
available. Some wh-phrases are ambiguous between interrogative and free relative readings 
(as we saw with sentence (3)). The exception to this is test (v), which does tell against a free 
relative reading.  Secondly, passing a test is a sufficient condition for a reading, but not a 
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necessary condition. Failing one test is not a guarantee of the absence of a particular reading: 
for example finite wh-phrases do not pass (v), but will pass all of the other tests for an 
interrogative reading. However, if a wh-phrase fails all of the tests for a reading, I take this to 
be good evidence that that reading is not present. Thirdly, these tests detect readings of a 
given wh-phrase independently of the embedding verb. There may be sentences in which a 
wh-phrase can have two readings, but the embedding verb forces one of those readings (such 
as sentence (2)). 
A typical know-how ascription – ‘Ruth knows how to get to Larissa’ – gives clearly 
positive results on tests (i), (ii) and (v). Tests (iii) and (iv) do not give clear positives, but 
don’t cause serious problems for the interrogative semantics. 
The wh-the-hell test (i) suggests an interrogative reading, since: 
(16) I don’t know how the hell to get to Larissa  
is an acceptable sentence. 
The co-ordination test (ii) also suggests an interrogative reading, since ‘how to get to 
Larissa’ can be moved into verbs that can only accept interrogative complements. Consider: 
(17) Ruth wondered how to get to Larissa  
(18) Ruth asked how to get to Larissa 
(19) Ruth inquired how to get to Larissa 
All of these sentences are completely acceptable. 
Whereas the patterning of the data on tests (i) and (ii) is robust, with all ‘knows how’ 
ascriptions passing these tests, the multiple question test (iii) is less decisive. We can find 
some examples of infinitival how ascriptions with multiple question words. For example: 
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(20) Ruth knows how to get to where 
(21) Ruth knows how to get to whom 
However such examples are few and far between, and seem to be of doubtful 
acceptability. I don’t think that the rarity of multiple questions ought to be too much of a 
worry for an interrogative treatment. For one thing, these tests provide merely sufficient 
conditions for an interrogative reading. Furthermore, it is just as difficult to find multiple 
question examples for ‘who to’, ‘where to’ and ‘whether to’, suggesting that the underlying 
pattern is that it is difficult to construct multiple wh-phrase for sentences involving infinitival 
wh-phrases. 
The paraphrase test (iv) is based on the observation that different question-words 
seem to be more or less favourable to the free relative reading, with ‘whether’ never taking a 
free relative reading.24 We might try to paraphrase ‘Ruth knows how to get to Larissa’ with a 
‘knows-whether’ ascription. Consider: 
(22) Ruth knows whether taking the road north is the way to get to Larissa. 
However, this does not seem like a particularly successful paraphrase for the original 
sentence. Again, because these tests provide sufficient conditions for an interrogative 
reading, the doubtfulness of this paraphrase is not a serious worry for the supporter of an 
interrogative reading.  
                                                                
24 As incidental support of the line that ‘knows how’ does not involve a free relative, it is worth noting 
that some linguists class ‘how’ along with ‘whether’ as a question-word which can never take a free 
relative reading (Baker 1995: 217) (Huddleston and Pullum 2008: 1072). This claim is too strong (for 
example, ‘I was upset because of how he acted’ pretty clearly involves a free relative, and ‘How she 
writes is unclear’ seems ambiguous between free relative and interrogative readings), but the fact that 
a number of prominent linguists have made this claim is indicative of how rare it is to find clear 
examples of ‘how’ functioning as a free relative. 
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The infinitive test (v) is crucial, since it both supports an interrogative reading, and 
speaks against a free relative reading. We have seen (from example (3)) that ‘knows’ can take 
both interrogatives and free relatives. However, when it comes to embedded infinitival wh-
phrases we can only seem to detect interrogative readings. The sentences: 
(23) Ruth knows when to turn off the road. 
(24) Ruth knows why to take the high road to Larissa. 
(25) Ruth knows whether to start off early or late. 
 seem only to mean that Ruth knows the propositions which answer the various 
indirect questions, and do not have objectual readings.25 Additionally verbs that can only take 
free relative wh-phrases – like ‘take’, ‘ate’ and ‘gave’ – cannot be combined with an 
infinitival wh-phrase. Consider: 
(26) ? Jane took what to use for cleaning the board. 
(27) ? John ate what to eat. 
(28) ? Amy gave what to use to write on the board. 
 Since there are no good examples of infinitival wh-phrases with a free relative 
reading, test (v) both strongly suggests an interrogative reading of ‘S knows how to V’, and 
speaks against a free relative reading. 
Let’s take stock. The results of tests (i), (ii), (v) strongly suggest the availability of an 
interrogative reading for sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’, and test (v) also speaks 
against a free relative reading. Tests (iii) and (iv) are not so decisive, but in the context of the 
positive results on the other tests these failures do not speak against the interrogative reading.  
                                                                
25 We shouldn’t be mislead by the ‘knows-the’ paraphrases for these sentences, which will involve a 
concealed question reading (see section 3). 
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This means that the simple view according to which ‘how to V’ always functions as a 
free relative in ‘knows how’ ascriptions is implausible. There are two ways in which the 
supporter of the free relative semantics might respond to these results: to argue that the free 
relative reading holds true for some sub-set of ‘knows how’ ascriptions, or to argue that 
‘knows how’ ascriptions are ambiguous between the two readings. 
The first move restricts attention to a sub-set of ‘knows how’, and suggest that some 
‘knows-how’ ascriptions are interrogatives and others free relatives. Although it is true that 
the philosophically interesting class of knowledge-how is not just all knowledge picked out 
with a how-complement, the most plausible way to linguistically delimit the philosophically 
interesting kind of know-how is to focus on ‘S knows how to V’ (Hornsby 1980: 84), (Glick 
2011: 427), (Wiggins 2012), which test (v) suggests is an especially implausible candidate for 
a free relative reading.26 A more plausible move would be to appeal to ambiguity, claiming 
that ‘knows how’ has both interrogative and free relative readings, like sentence (3). This 
kind of view could explain the positive results on tests (i) and (ii) since if ‘know-how’ were 
ambiguous, the addition of interrogative modifiers or embedding within a verb like ‘wonder’ 
would force the interrogative reading.  
However, the ambiguity view runs into serious problems. For one thing, test (v) 
speaks both for the interrogative reading, and against the free relative reading. It is also worth 
noting that B&M have themselves pointed out that ‘knows how’ fails standard tests for ambiguity 
(B&M 2007: 38-40), (Bengson, Moffett and Wright, 2009: 393-4). Furthermore, the standard tests 
for a free relative reading come up negative, suggesting that there is no available free relative 
reading. There are two tests for a free relative reading: 
                                                                
26 Perhaps finite ‘knows how’ ascriptions might provide better case for a free relative reading. For 
example, ‘Jane knows how coffee smells’, seems at least on one reading to denote a kind of 
acquaintance knowledge (Moore 1997: 183), and actually passes test (vi) for a free relative reading. 
Since these ascriptions do not ascribe the practical species of knowledge-how, the existence of a free 
relative reading of these sentences is incidental to our main concern here. 
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vi) Wh-ever: If the wh-word can be extended to wh-ever, then the wh-phrase is a 
free relative (Bresnan and Grimshaw 1978: 334-5), (Huddleston and Pullum 
2008: 986-7); 
vii) Co-ordination: if the wh-phrase can be combined with a verb which cannot 
take an interrogative complement – like ‘took’, ‘believes’, or ’ate’ – then it has 
a free relative reading (Bresnan and Grimshaw 1978: 332), (Baker 1995: 204-
7).  
Test (vi) gives a negative result for a free relative reading. Sentences of the form: 
(29) ? Ruth knows however to get to Larissa. 
are not acceptable. 
The co-ordination test with ‘believes’ (vii) also brings bad news. If the ambiguity 
story were correct, we would expect that ‘how to V’ could combine with ‘believes’, and other 
predicates which cannot embedded interrogatives. Consider: 
(30) ? Ruth believes how to get to Larissa 
The weirdness of this result seems to reconfirm Ryle’s observation that we don’t 
believe-how (Ryle 2009:17).27 
 Kent Bach (2012) suggests an extension of this test, claiming that ‘practice’, 
‘demonstrate’ and ‘perfect’ cannot relate to propositions, meaning that the fact that these 
                                                                
27 Stanley suggests that ‘believes’ cannot take ‘how to V’ is because it cannot ever take interrogative 
complements (2011b: 33). This conjecture seems false. There are examples of the form ‘I could 
hardly believe…’, which seem to involve genuine interrogatives. If I say, ‘I could hardly believe what 
he was wearing,’ it isn’t the clothes, but that he was wearing them which is difficult to believe. (Glick 
2011: footnote 9). Although this fact somewhat undermines the significance of the ‘believes’ data, it 
remains true i) that putting the special ‘could hardly’ context to one side ’believes’ can embed free 
relative clauses, such as ‘what he said’ but not ‘how to’ clauses, and ii) other verbs which select for a 
free relative reading - such as ‘ate’, and ‘took’ do not embed ‘how to’ clauses. Thanks to Ephraim 
Glick for discussion. 
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verbs can embed ‘how to V’ provides evidence for a free relative reading. It is certainly true 
that ‘practice’, ‘demonstrate’ and ‘perfect’ cannot take that-clauses as their objects.28 
However, if we look a little closer at the wh-phrases that can embed in these verbs, it 
becomes clear that they can embed interrogatives (see Pavese 2013: footnote 15). These 
verbs can take infinitival wh-phrases, ‘whether’ questions, and multiple questions, which we 
have seen above can only be interrogatives:  
(31) Mark practiced what to say. 
(32) Jane demonstrated whether to use ‘less’ or ‘fewer’ in the example sentences.29 
(33) Ana perfected what to do when. 
 The acceptability of (31), (32), and (33) suggests that these verbs can take 
interrogatives, meaning that the fact that ‘how to V’ can embed in them does not provide 
evidence for a free relative reading.  
As I noted above, the failure to pass all of the tests for a given reading provides strong 
evidence that that reading is not present, meaning that the failure of ’S knows how to V’ to 
pass (vi) and (vii) gives us strong evidence that it has no free relative reading. Together with 
test (v) this establishes a strong case against the suggestion that ‘S knows how to V’ has a 
free relative reading. I conclude that the how-complement in ‘S knows how to V’ can take an 
interrogative reading, but not a free relative reading. 
5. Conclusion 
                                                                
28 A caveat: one can demonstrate that p, but only with the sense which means ‘establish’, which is not 
at issue here. 
29 Note that even if one is doubtful about (32), ‘demonstrate’ can take both infinitival wh-phrases, and 
multiple wh-phrases. 
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Although a free relative semantics for knowledge-how ascriptions initially appears to 
be an attractive way to semantically implement a non-propositional account of knowledge-
how, on balance this semantic account is linguistically implausible. The linguistic data which 
B&M point to, although suggestive, can also be explained by the standard interrogative 
semantics. Furthermore, standard linguistic tests suggests that sentences of the form ’S knows 
how to V’ have an interrogative reading, and no free relative reading. The linguistic 
implausibility of this view means that an Objectualist metaphysics needs to look elsewhere to 
semantically implement their account. In §2 I suggested that they have two options: to 
develop a novel semantics which is compatible with their view, or to endorse an error theory 
according to which ordinary sentences of English do not pick out states of knowledge-how.30 
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